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NOTES
DNA IS DIFFERENT:
AN EXPLORATION OF THE CURRENT
INADEQUACIES OF GENETIC PRIVACY
PROTECTION IN RECREATIONAL
DNA DATABASES
JAMIE M. ZEEVI†
“You may never commit a crime. But how should you feel if your
DNA was used to locate a distant relative who did?”1
INTRODUCTION
Joseph James DeAngelo Jr., more infamously known as the
Golden State Killer,2 committed at least one hundred burglaries,
raped at least fifty women, and murdered at least twelve people
between 1974 and 1986.3 It took law enforcement officials more
than forty years to identify him.4 Ray Charles Waller, recently
identified as the NorCal Rapist, attacked and raped at least eleven

†
Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Washington University in St. Louis. With many
thanks to my family for their unwavering love, support, and encouragement, and to
the members and editors of the St. John’s Law Review for their hard work and
assistance in preparing my Note for publication.
1
Gina Kolata & Heather Murphy, The Golden State Killer is Tracked
Through a Thicket of DNA, and Experts Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/health/dna-privacy-golden-state-killergenealogy.html.
2
While most widely known as the Golden State Killer, DeAngelo has also been
“variously called the East Area Rapist, Original Nightstalker, Diamond Knot Killer
and Visalia Ransacker . . . .” Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer,
Investigators First Found His Great-Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST
(Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-allegedgolden-state-killer-investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/
2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html.
3
Id.; see also Benjy Egel, Here’s the String of Crimes Tied to the East Area Rapist
in Years of California Terror, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 29, 2018, 4:52 AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article209788654.html.
4
Jouvenal, supra note 2.
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women between 1991 and 2006.5 It took law enforcement officials
more than twenty-seven years to identify him.6 William Earl
Talbott II was arrested in May 2018 for a double murder
committed thirty years earlier, in 1987.7
In each of these cases, investigators identified the suspects
using a technique called “familial DNA searching,”8 by which
investigators match DNA found at crime scenes to the DNA of
family members in DNA databases.9 While conducting familial
DNA searches in criminal DNA databases like the Combined DNA
Index System (“CODIS”) is still a relatively new technique,10
conducting such searches in recreational DNA databases is brand
new.11 And this is only the beginning. For example, as of May
5
See Sam Stanton, Benjy Egel, Darrell Smith & Cynthia Hubert, NorCal Rapist
Suspect Arrested. He’s a 58-Year-Old Safety Specialist at UC Berkeley, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Sept. 23, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/article
218793610.html.
6
See id.
7
See Caleb Hutton & Rikki King, Suspect Arrested in 1987 Deaths of Young
Couple From BC, HERALD NET (Everett, Wa.) (May 18, 2018, 8:55 PM),
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/suspect-arrested-in-1987-deaths-of-young-couplefrom-bc/.
8
Tina Hesman Saey, New Genetic Sleuthing Tools Helped Track Down
the Golden State Killer Suspect, SCI. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2018, 9:49 AM),
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/golden-state-killer-suspect-dna-geneticsgenealogy (“Investigators . . . used a public genealogy database, GEDmatch, to
connect crime scene evidence to distant relatives of Joseph James DeAngelo.”);
Stanton et al., supra note 5 (“The investigation was nearly a carbon copy of the one
that led authorities to . . . Joseph James DeAngelo. . . . [I]nvestigators . . . entered
DNA from the NorCal Rapist crime scenes into a ‘genetic genealogy’ website called
GEDmatch . . . .”); Hutton & King, supra note 7 (“[William Earl Talbott] was
determined to be the only potential suspect through . . . the same technique used to
find the suspected Golden State Killer . . . .”).
9
See Frederick R. Bieber, Charles H. Brenner & David Lazer, Finding Criminals
Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCI. 1315, 1315 (2006).
10
United States’ national forensic DNA database, CODIS, was formally
established in 1994. Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last
visited Aug. 29, 2019). Familial searching in forensic DNA databases was first used
in the United Kingdom in 2001 to identify Joseph Kappen as the Saturday
Night Strangler. Science of the Future: Identifying Criminals Through Their
Family Members, DNA FORENSICS, http://www.dnaforensics.com/familialsearches.
aspx#kappen (last visited Aug. 29, 2019); see also Kevin Toolis, The Hunt for the
Saturday Night Strangler, THE GUARDIAN (London) (Jan. 17, 2003, 7:48 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2003/jan/18/weekend.kevintoolis. The first
United States case solved using this method to search in CODIS was solved in 2009.
See Jim Spellman, Using Relative’s DNA Cracks Crime, but Privacy Questions Raised,
CNN (Nov. 18, 2009, 3:56 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/17/colorado.
family.dna/index.html.
11
See The Golden State Killer case was the first successful use of familial
searching in a recreational DNA database. Dan Vergano & Virginia Hughes, A Serial
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2018, Parabon NanoLabs, a forensic DNA analysis company, had
already uploaded about one hundred crime scene DNA samples to
GEDmatch and found third cousin or closer matches for twenty
of these samples.12 As the use of familial DNA searching in
recreational DNA databases becomes a more prevalent tool
in forensic investigations, consideration must be given to
individuals’ genetic privacy, and statutory protections must be
implemented regarding law enforcement’s access to, and use of,
this information.
Throughout the United States, hobbyists and curious
individuals are voluntarily “buil[ding a] . . . genetic panopticon” in
recreational DNA databases, using services like AncestryDNA,
23andMe, MyHeritage DNA, and FamilyTreeDNA, among
others, to do so.13 Furthermore, public recreational websites like
GEDmatch provide people the opportunity to upload their raw
DNA data for free in order to cross-reference their results with the
results of individuals who have used similar services from other
companies.14 While exploring genealogy to discover where one’s
ancestors came from, to build one’s family tree, or to connect with

Killer Was Caught Because Investigators Found His Family’s DNA on a Website,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Apr. 27, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
danvergano/serial-killer-dna-testing.
12
Sarah Zhang, The Coming Wave of Murders Solved by Genealogy, THE
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/05/thecoming-wave-of-murders-solved-by-genealogy/560750/ [hereinafter Zhang, The
Coming Wave of Murders Solved]. These numbers continue to grow. Parabon
NanoLabs stated that as of December 2018, it had uploaded over two hundred DNA
profiles to GEDmatch. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting is Family Tree
Forensics, WIRED (Dec. 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-futureof-crime-fighting-is-family-tree-forensics/. In 2018, genetic genealogy was used as a
tool in two hundred cases. As of December 2019, genealogy searches in GEDmatch
helped “law enforcement [to] solv[e] over 70 cold cases in the U.S.” Kameran Wong,
A Message to Verogen Customers about the GEDmatch Partnership, VEROGEN (Dec.
10, 2019), https://verogen.com/a-message-to-verogen-customers-about-the-gedmatchpartnership/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
13
Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches,
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supremecourt-rewrite-rules-dna-searches; see also Antonio Regalado, 2017 Was the
Year Consumer DNA Testing Blew Up, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610233/2017-was-the-year-consumer-dnatesting-blew-up/.
14
See Susan Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means for Your Genetic
Privacy, CNN (May 1, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/27/health/
golden-state-killer-genetic-privacy/index.html [hereinafter Scutti, What the Golden
State Killer Case Means].
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one’s distant or long-lost relatives may be exciting, unrestricted
access to this DNA data may result in unwarranted invasions of
people’s privacy.
It is possible to discern from one person’s DNA the identities
of others to whom that person is biologically related.15 Each
individual in a DNA database is like “a beacon that illuminates
hundreds of distant relatives . . . . [I]t’s enough to have your third
cousin or your second cousin once-removed in these databases to
actually identify you.”16 In fact, a recent study suggests that the
DNA in these databases will soon have the potential to identify
nearly everyone.17 Beginning with a DNA database containing
samples from 1.3 million individuals, investigators were able to
narrow a person’s identity to fewer than twenty individuals simply
by inputting “basic information such as someone’s rough age.”18
Notably, this study found that this search method has the
potential to identify sixty percent of Americans with European
heritage regardless of whether many of those people had ever
submitted their genetic information to a recreational DNA
database.19 For perspective, 23andMe boasts more than five
15

See Kelly Lowenberg, Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for
One Purpose is Tested for Another, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1294 (2011) (“A partial
match between two DNA samples indicates that the two donors have a common
genetic lineage.”). “A sibling shares half of [one’s] genetic profile. A cousin shares an
eighth.” Carolyn Johnson, Even If You’ve Never Taken a DNA Test, A Distant
Relative’s Could Reveal Your Identity, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/10/11/even-if-youve-never-taken-dnatest-distant-relatives-could-reveal-your-identity/. Furthermore, information gleaned
from one person’s DNA can disclose information about the rest of that person’s family.
See Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.
16
Rob Stein, Easy DNA Identifications With Genealogy Databases Raise Privacy
Concerns, NPR (Oct. 11, 2018, 3:58 PM), (quoting Yaniv Erlich), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2018/10/11/656268742/easy-dna-identifications-withgenealogy-databases-raise-privacy-concerns. Yaniv Erlich is an expert in the field of
computational human genetics, as well as a New York Genome Center Core
Member and an Associate Professor of Computer Science and Computational Biology
at Columbia University. COLUMBIA UNIV. DATA SCI. INST., https://datascience.
columbia.edu/yaniv-erlich (last visited Sep. 15, 2019). He is also the Chief
Science Officer at MyHeritage. MyHeritage Management Team, MYHERITAGE,
https://www.myheritage.com/management/yaniv_erlich (last visited Sep. 15, 2019).
17
Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer
Can Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nabgolden-state-killer-can-home-about-60-white (“In a few years, it’s really going be
everyone.” (quoting Yaniv Erlich)).
18
Id.
19
Malcolm Ritter, Study: DNA Websites Cast Broad Net for Identifying People,
MED. XPRESS (Oct. 11, 2018), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-10-dna-websitesbroad-net-people.html. This study was conducted using DNA samples of individuals
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million customers, while AncestryDNA boasts ten million,20 and
GEDmatch has stated that it sees almost one thousand new
uploads per day.21 And these are just a few of all the recreational
DNA services currently available.
Furthermore, government, law enforcement, and the general
public currently have wide access to the DNA collected and stored
in public recreational DNA databases like GEDmatch. In fact,
until the news broke explaining the method investigators used to
identify the Golden State Killer, even the operators of GEDmatch
were unaware that police could use such websites for criminal
investigations, illustrating how little people consider the
ramifications of submitting their raw DNA data to such websites.22
As recreational genealogy services become increasingly popular,
law enforcement will likely become more enthusiastic about the
investigation potential that familial searching in these databases
holds. While familial searching may be an effective way to catch
violent criminals, the use of familial DNA in forensic
investigations is a new legal frontier, and regulations of whose
DNA data may be accessed or used, by whom, when, and how, are
spotty and unclear.23 In fact, there are currently no legal
restrictions on familial searching in recreational DNA databases.24

with European descent, as this was the largest group in the database used. Id.
GEDmatch’s database currently “only encompasses about 0.5% of the U.S. adult
population. . . . Once the GEDmatch figure rises to 2%, more than 90% of people of
European descent will have a third cousin or closer relative and could be found in this
way.” Kaiser, supra note 17. FamilyTreeDNA, a site similar to GEDmatch, also allows
law enforcement to use its databases to conduct familial searching, which “roughly
doubles the number of genetic profiles cops may use.” Kristen V. Brown,
No One is Safeguarding Your DNA, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2019, 5:18 PM),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/businessweek/law-enforcement-can-do-whatever-itlikes-with-consumer-dna-data.
20
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.
21
Molteni, supra note 12.
22
See Justin Jouvenal, Mark Berman, Drew Harwell & Tom Jackman, A
Genealogy Site Led Police to the Golden State Killer. Who Else Can Tap Into This DNA
‘Treasure Trove’?, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 28, 2018, 4:47 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
news/nationworld/ct-golden-state-killer-dna-implications-20180428-story.html.
23
For example, some states allow familial searching in forensic DNA databases,
and some do not. Sarah Zhang, How A Tiny Website Became the Police’s
Go-To Genealogy Database, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2018), https://www.the
atlantic.com/science/archive/2018/06/gedmatch-police-genealogy-database/561695/
[hereinafter Zhang, How A Tiny Website].
24
See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“[L]egally,
it’s the Wild West when it comes to commercial genetic testing companies.”).
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The lack of legal restrictions and regulations on the use of
recreational DNA databases is concerning, as there is nothing to
prevent the potential abuse of this practice by law enforcement or
by civilians.25 First, the current lack of restrictions allows this
technique to be utilized to investigate any crime at any time.
While supporters argue that this technique is helpful in solving
violent murder and rape cases, there is currently “no downward
limit” on when or on which types of crimes law enforcement may
use familial DNA searching in recreational databases.26 Familial
DNA searching was recently used for the first time as a tool in an
assault investigation.27 Once police identified the suspect, a
seventeen-year-old high school student, police directed the school
resource officer to surveil the student in the cafeteria and to collect
the student’s discarded milk and juice cartons for use in
confirming the DNA match.28 The school resource officer did so.29
It is not a far leap from using familial DNA searching in murder
and rape investigations to using it in assault investigations. It is
also not difficult to imagine the next leap—the use of the technique
in petty crime investigations.

25

See Stein, supra note 16 (“The police currently [are] using these techniques to
find . . . [murderers] and bad people, . . . But are we OK with using this technique to
identify people in a political demonstration who left their DNA behind?”); see also Nila
Bala, We’re Entering a New Phase in Law Enforcement’s Use of Consumer Genetic
Data, SLATE (Dec. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.slate.com/technology/2019/
12/gedmatch-verogen-genetic-genealogy-law-enforcement.html (noting unsettling
possibilities “including having our genes held ransom,” and “people pretending to be
our relatives asking for our help”); Paige St. John, DNA Genealogical Databases are a
Gold Mine for Police, but with Few Rules and Little Transparency, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 24, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-24/lawenforcement-dna-crime-cases-privacy (“In Texas, police met search guidelines by
classifying a case as sexual assault but after an arrest only filed charges of burglary.
[In California], prosecutors have persuaded a judge to treat unsuspecting genetic
contributors as "confidential informants" and seal searches so consumers are not
scared away from adding their own DNA to the forensic stockpile.”). While beyond the
scope of this Note, because the DNA in recreational databases is not legally protected,
it is also foreseeable that familial searching in websites like GEDmatch may be used
by drug and insurance companies to do things like targeting advertising or
building out “vast networks of relatedness to determine [insurance] risk.” Brown,
supra note 19.
26
Elizabeth Joh, Want to See My Genes? Get A Warrant, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/opinion/police-dna-warrant.html.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
See id.
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Second, there is currently no legal recourse for someone whose
DNA, or whose genetic relatives’ DNA, was utilized in a criminal
investigation.30 No clear remedies exist for “mistakes, the
discovery of embarrassing or intrusive information, or misuse of
the information.”31 Furthermore, law enforcement increasingly
outsources its familial DNA searching to forensic companies and
individual genetic genealogists.32 However, genetic genealogy is a
profession that currently has neither formal rules nor “academic
training or certification program[s],” to ensure the quality of work
provided.33 Law enforcement’s unrestricted use of familial DNA
searching in recreational databases and its outsourcing of this
work, combined with the tremendously revealing nature of DNA,
creates the perfect storm for errors, abuse, or both.
Additionally, relatives of individuals who voluntarily submit
their DNA samples to recreational genealogy websites do not have
adequate means available to protect their own genetic privacy.
Current constitutional and statutory protections do not protect
voluntarily submitted DNA stored in recreational DNA databases.
Moreover, traditional understandings of the legal considerations
around privacy do not map onto DNA data. DNA is different.
Given our lack of knowledge regarding the potential of DNA as
well as the lack of regulations regarding the use of this DNA data,
it is imperative that statutory protections are implemented.
Part I of this Note discusses the fundamental science behind
DNA and defines and explains the process of familial DNA
searching. Part I also discusses how Carpenter v. United States
provides a framework to begin thinking about the unique nature
of DNA and privacy implications for its use, and why the revealing
nature of this type of data warrants protection. Part II of this Note
delves into the lack of constitutional and statutory protections for
DNA in recreational DNA databases. First, Part II explains that
traditional Fourth Amendment concepts, like search warrants,
probable cause, reasonable expectation of privacy, third-party
doctrine, and consent, do not adequately protect or map onto DNA
stored in recreational databases. Next, Part II highlights the
complete absence of statutory protections for the forensic use of
30

Molteni, supra note 12.
Joh, supra note 26.
32
See Laura Hautala, How Sharing Your DNA Solves Horrible Crimes . . . and
Stirs A Privacy Debate, CNET (July 2, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/
how-sharing-your-dna-solves-horrible-crimes-and-stirs-a-privacy-debate.
33
Id.
31
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DNA in this particular context. Part III assesses the strength of
common arguments intended to minimize the necessity of
statutory protection and concludes that they are not persuasive.
Such arguments include the strong government interest in being
able to use familial searching to solve and prevent crimes, the
anonymization of DNA samples to resolve privacy concerns, and
the work-intensive nature of familial searching in these databases
tending to decrease the likelihood that the technique would be
used frequently. Finally, Part IV asserts that statutory protection
is the appropriate solution and that it is imperative to protect the
genetic information of individuals stored in recreational DNA
databases against invasive use by government actors. Part IV also
provides an overview of possible regulations.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

DNA and Familial DNA Searching Defined

DNA, which makes up genes,34 “is an information-rich
material contained in every cell in our bodies,” and defines who we
are in the most fundamental way.35 To identify individuals in
CODIS using their DNA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) analyzes short tandem repeats, also known as STRs or
“ ‘junk’ genes.”36 STRs “can be repeated dozens or hundreds of
times” throughout an individual’s genome, and the number of
repeats varies from individual to individual.37 These junk genes
are valuable to the FBI mainly for their ability to identify
individuals, as they do not appear to reveal historical medical or
clinical information about a person.38 “Each [CODIS] profile looks
for STRs in up to 20 locations in the human genome.”39 In contrast,
recreational DNA databases do not use STRs and instead use
single nucleotide polymorphisms (“SNPs”), which look for

34
What is a Gene?, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED.,
GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/basics/gene (last visited
Sep. 15, 2019).
35
Lowenberg, supra note 15, at 1292.
36
Lowenberg, supra note 15, at 1293; Erin Murphy, Law and Policy Oversight of
Familial Searches in Recreational Genealogy Databases, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e5,
e5 (2018). “The adjective ‘junk’ may mislead the layperson, for in fact this is the DNA
region used with near certainty to identify a person.” Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435,
442 (2013).
37
Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23.
38
Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.
39
Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23.
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information at about 600,000 locations in the genome.40 SNPs are
rich in information,41 and at the very least can be used to trace
a person’s heritage, identify distant relatives,42 predict
physical appearance, and forecast future wellness and disease
propensities.43 And the use of SNPs by recreational services
makes sense when one remembers that “[p]eople submit their
DNA to sites like 23andMe or MyHeritage because they want to
know more about their genetic make-up than just identity.”44
Whether STRs or SNPs are analyzed, a familial DNA search
is defined as “an intentional or deliberate search of [a DNA]
database conducted after a routine search for the purpose of
potentially identifying close biological relatives of [an] unknown
forensic sample associated with [a] crime scene profile.”45 In order
to conduct a familial search in a DNA database, investigators first
convert recovered crime scene DNA into raw DNA data.46 They
then submit this raw data into a DNA database with the aim of
getting a partial match, which would indicate a genetic relative.47
If a partial match is made, investigators painstakingly build out
the perpetrator’s genetic family tree48 and utilize records to zero in
on which family members were of the “right age and in the right
place to have committed the crime.”49 Once suspects are identified,
investigators will work to obtain DNA samples from the suspects
“through . . . court order[s] or by surreptitious means”50 like

40

Id.
Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.
42
Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23.
43
Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.
44
Id.
45
Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/
codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
46
Nicole L. Cvetnic, How Police Use DNA ‘Familial Searches’ to Probe Murders,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 27, 2018, 5:20 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/
crime/article217427845.html.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Doug Stevens & Maura Dolan, How Familial DNA Searches Work, L.A.
TIMES (May 9, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-g-familial-dna-howit-works-20180426-story.html; see also Brown, supra note 19 (“The true power of
genetic information . . . is realized in conjunction with other online data culled
from . . . public records and social networks.”).
50
Cvetnic, supra note 46.
41
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surveilling suspects and collecting discarded items that may
contain DNA samples.51 Finally, an individual is confirmed as a
suspect if the crime scene DNA matches the collected DNA.52
Because CODIS uses STRs, if a familial search in CODIS
identifies any partial matches at all, the number will be relatively
low. This is because these searches are only capable of identifying
“potential sibling[s], parent[s], or child[ren] of the target,” whose
DNA profiles are already in the CODIS database because they
have also come into contact with the criminal justice system.53
Additionally, basic identification information is nearly the only
information available to investigators regarding the individuals
affected by these searches.54 By contrast, because recreational
DNA services use SNPs, experts have estimated that the number
of partial matches can exceed hundreds, if not thousands, of
potential relatives because SNP searches “produce[] leads much
farther out—to ‘relatives’ unlikely to know of each other’s
relatedness.”55 Significantly, investigators will have access to vast
amounts of genetic information regarding the individuals affected
by these searches.56
For more than forty years, investigators exhausted traditional
investigative options trying to identify a suspect for the crimes
committed by the Golden State Killer.57 Although “[c]riminal DNA
databases produced no hits,” GEDmatch did.58 In fact, the search
in GEDmatch produced between ten and twenty distant cousins.59
Investigators traced the lineages of these distant cousins to a
common ancestor that they shared with the Golden State Killer,
which “turned out to be great-great-great grandparents from the
early 1800s.”60 They were able to then compile about twenty-five
“distinct family trees from the great-great-great grandparents,”
with the branch that contained Joseph James DeAngelo, Jr.
including more than one thousand family members alone.61

51

Hautala, supra note 32.
Cvetnic, supra note 46.
53
Murphy, supra note 36, at e6.
54
See id. at e5 (“Forensic STRs were specifically chosen as “junk” genes—markers
with little value other than identification.”).
55
Id. at e6.
56
See id.
57
See Jouvenal, supra note 2.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
52
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The Golden State Killer case is a powerful illustration of the
extensive scope of these searches, how many individuals
potentially may be included, and why the process of familial DNA
searching in recreational DNA databases is so intrusive. The
genetic information available to investigators belonging to
presumptively innocent individuals in recreational databases is
extensive and deeply personal.
In fact, “SNPs have not
[previously] been used in the criminal justice context” precisely
because they are so rich in information.62 Furthermore, it is
currently impossible to fathom all that we will be able to
understand in the future from an individual’s DNA regarding that
individual or her genetic familial network.63
For these reasons and more, including the ability to implicate
countless individuals with one DNA sample, DNA is different from
other types of information, and its use for any purpose—especially
in criminal investigations—must be strictly protected. While
there may be a strong public interest rationale for conducting
familial DNA searches in recreational databases in order to catch
violent criminals, there must be limits on how, under what
circumstances, and by whom this DNA can be used to avoid
potential illegitimate uses. Because DNA is such a unique type of
information, how do we begin to think about this type of data and
whether and how it should be protected and regulated?
B. Carpenter v. United States as a Framework for Considering
the Uniqueness of DNA Data
Carpenter v. United States, decided by the United States
Supreme Court in June 2018, provides a framework for
understanding the type of information contained within DNA and
why it requires protection. Carpenter concerned an investigation
in which the FBI obtained location information for Carpenter for
a four-month period in which it suspected Carpenter had
committed multiple robberies.64 “Altogether the Government
obtained 12,898 location points [from Carpenter’s cell phone
62

Murphy, supra note 36, at e5–e6.
For example, forensic experts used DNA “to build three composite images of [a]
suspect’s likely appearance, an estimate of what he would look like at ages 25, 45, and
65. . . . The faces are educated guesses, based on genetic makeup of DNA found
on crime scene evidence.” Caleb Hutton, DNA Analysis Conjures the Possible Face
of a 1987 Killer, HERALD NET (Everett, Wa.) (Apr. 11, 2018, 8:04 PM),
https://www.heraldnet.com/news/dna-analysis-conjures-the-possible-face-of-a1987-killer.
64
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
63
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carriers,] cataloging Carpenter’s movements—an average of 101
data points per day.”65 Carpenter moved to suppress the cell-site
location information (“CSLI”), which the Government planned to
use to prove that Carpenter’s cell phone was near the sites of the
robberies.66 The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which
decided that because of the unique nature of CSLI, the government
invaded Carpenter’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” in his
“physical movements” when it acquired his CSLI information from
his wireless carrier.67
In determining that CSLI is a unique type of data, the Court
described the role of cell phones today as “almost a ‘feature of
human anatomy’ ”68 and as “indispensable to participation in
modern society.”69 CSLI is automatically collected when one uses
a cell phone “without any affirmative act on the part of the user
beyond powering up.”70 The Court continued that because CSLI is
collected from everyone who uses a cell phone, and “not just those
belonging to persons who might happen to come under
investigation[,] this newfound tracking capacity runs against
everyone.”71 Describing the nature of CSLI as “deeply revealing,”72
“detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”73 the Court
explained that CSLI is capable of “provid[ing] an intimate
window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular
movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, [and]
professional . . . associations,’ ”74 which “hold for many Americans
the privacies of life.”75
Furthermore, the Court contrasted traditional searches in
which police have to establish reasonable suspicion of an
individual before tracking their movements, with CSLI, which
boasts a uniquely “retrospective quality.”76 The Court noted that
with CSLI, “police need not even know in advance whether they
65

Id.
See id. at 2212, 2213.
67
Id. at 2219.
68
Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
69
Id. at 2220.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 2218.
72
Id. at 2223.
73
Id. at 2216.
74
Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
75
Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
76
See id. at 2218.
66
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want to follow a particular individual, or when,” because they have
the ability to gain access to this information after the fact.77 Due
to the uniquely extensive and revealing nature of CSLI, as well as
the availability of CSLI to investigators at any time during an
investigation, the Court determined that CSLI is particularly
deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.78
Read outside the specific factual context of Carpenter, the
Court’s description of this unique type of information, as well as
the privacy concerns surrounding it, could just as easily
be referring to DNA as to CSLI. While the Court’s analysis in
Carpenter does not map directly onto DNA or address privacy
interests in the information of others, DNA data is arguably at
least as unique as CSLI, if not more so. Literally a “feature of
human anatomy,”79 DNA, like CSLI, is a profoundly revealing,
“detailed, [and] encyclopedic”80 illustration of who an individual is
at the most fundamental level. In contrast to CSLI, DNA is not
capable of detailing where a person—or a cell phone—was located
at any particular time. However, DNA provides an even more
intimate and thorough window into who a person is. DNA is
unique in that it has the potential to irrefutably shed light not only
on a person’s identity, but also on who that person is related to,
among many other things. Use of CSLI data does not affect
countless people. DNA does. If the Carpenter Court considers a
person’s “familial, political, [and] professional . . . associations”81
to be “privacies of life,”82 a person’s genetic makeup and genetic
family tree surely must be considered at least as private.
Furthermore, while using a cell phone may be “indispensable
to participation in modern society,”83 having DNA is a fact of life.
We have DNA by virtue of being human beings, and “[w]e leave
[it] everywhere we go. Everywhere we touch has DNA.”84
Moreover, when a distant, unknown relative provides her DNA to
a genealogy website, information that implicates countless
individuals is collected “without any affirmative act on the
77
Id. “[T]he retrospective quality of the data here gives police access to a category
of information otherwise unknowable.” Id.
78
Id. at 2220.
79
Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385).
80
Id. at 2216.
81
Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
82
Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403).
83
Id. at 2220.
84
Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23.
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part of”85 those individuals.86 As people continue to build out
recreational DNA databases, “this newfound tracking capacity
[will] run[] against everyone,”87 because everyone has DNA and
everyone has genetic relatives.
Finally, like CSLI, DNA information has a “retrospective
quality”88 that involves exponentially more individuals—some
long gone89—as massive recreational DNA databases continue to
flourish.90 While one person’s CSLI records can tell investigators
each place where that person’s cell phone was located for the past
five years,91 one person’s DNA data can reveal far more about that
person themselves and myriad relatives, past and present.92 Like
CSLI, this DNA information is preserved in a database until
someone chooses to use it, or one explicitly requests to have it
deleted.93 However, a critical difference is that when investigators
access DNA data from these websites, they access a vast wealth of
information about countless individuals without any regulation or
oversight at all.94 In Carpenter, the Court stressed that “the
progress of science has afforded law enforcement a powerful new
tool to carry out its important responsibilities. At the same time,
this tool risks Government encroachment of the sort the Framers,
‘after consulting the lessons of history,’ drafted the Fourth

85

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
See Stein, supra note 16 (explaining that once a person submits her DNA to a
recreational service, that person has “made a decision not just for [her]self but for
[her] siblings, for [her] distant cousins, people [she does not] even know [she is] related
to, for [her] children, for [her] children's children.” (quoting Erin Murphy) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
87
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
88
Id.
89
Cf. Jouvenal, supra note 2.
90
Regalado, supra note 13.
91
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“[W]ireless carriers . . . maintain records for
up to five years.”).
92
See supra Section I.A.
93
See Erin Brodwin, DNA-Testing Company 23andMe Has Signed a $300 Million
Deal with a Drug Giant. Here’s How to Delete Your Data If That Freaks You Out, BUS.
INSIDER (July 25, 2018, 5:27 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/dna-testingdelete-your-data-23andme-ancestry-2018-7. Depending on the genealogy service used,
a request to delete DNA information may not be sufficient to entirely remove that
information from the database. For example, while 23andMe will discard a consumer’s
DNA sample, the terms of the consent agreement make it unclear whether a
consumer’s “raw genetic data” will be discarded. Id. Further, while a consumer can
delete her DNA results from Ancestry.com, the company will not delete the consumer’s
genetic data from any research projects the consumer previously opted into. Id. Most
strikingly, Helix can keep a consumer’s DNA “indefinitely.” Id.
94
See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14.
86
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Amendment to prevent.”95 Thus, DNA in recreational databases,
like CSLI, is deserving of Fourth Amendment protections.
Traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, is
inadequate to protect this type of information.
II. LACK OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROTECTIONS
In the most fundamental way, DNA makes a person who she
is. An individual’s DNA stores that individual’s most personal,
private secrets—secrets that even she herself may not be aware of.
Among these many secrets is one that connects her to countless
genetic relatives, familiar and unfamiliar, past, present, and
future.96 DNA’s ability to connect us to so many other individuals
in such an intimate way is something that makes DNA
particularly unique. However, because DNA is such a distinctive
type of information, neither constitutional nor current statutory
protections adequately protect the genetic privacy interests
implicated by DNA stored in recreational DNA databases.
This Section will describe why current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is not protective of genetic privacy in commercial
DNA databases. First, the Supreme Court has not addressed
whether a warrant is necessary before law enforcement obtains
DNA information from a recreational DNA database.97 Further
indicating the intrusiveness of familial searching in recreational
databases is the fact that a familial search will not necessarily
result in a perpetrator’s identification; rather, the government
utilizes this investigative technique and obtains sensitive personal
information without any probable cause to believe that evidence of
a crime will be found in a recreational database. Second, current
jurisprudence focused on reasonable expectations of privacy does
not protect the DNA stored in recreational databases because, due
to the nature of DNA, there is a fundamental inability to exclude
others from information that may be disclosed by, or may
implicate, any number of genetic relatives. Third, using the logic
set out in Carpenter and highlighting DNA’s unique ability to
implicate others, the third-party doctrine should not be applied
to DNA stored in recreational DNA databases. Finally, consent
95
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948)).
96
See Stein, supra note 16.
97
See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Matthew Haag, FamilyTreeDNA Admits to Sharing
Genetic Data With F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
02/04/business/family-tree-dna-fbi.html; see also infra Section II.A.1.
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given by customers of recreational DNA services is not truly
informed consent, and when one individual consents to participate
in these services she effectively gives consent on behalf of all of her
past, present, and future genetic relatives. This Section will also
describe the current lack of statutory protections for DNA stored
in recreational databases, and will underscore how the genetic
privacy of individuals whose DNA is stored in CODIS is currently
more protected than the genetic privacy of individuals whose DNA
is stored in recreational databases, which provide a much more
sophisticated and robust set of data.
A.

Traditional Fourth Amendment Protections Do Not Reach
DNA Stored in Recreational DNA Databases

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”98 The purposes of the Fourth Amendment are “to
secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power’ ”99 and
“ ‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police
surveillance.’ ”100 As technology has progressed into the era of big
data and can track, record, and store in the hands of third parties
seemingly unlimited information about individuals, how we
protect this type of information must be reconsidered. As the
Supreme Court noted in Carpenter, “the Court is obligated—as
‘[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have
become available to the Government’—to ensure that the ‘progress
of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”101 It is
time that the law catches up with DNA technology.
1.

Search Warrants and Probable Cause

While law enforcement is typically required to obtain a search
warrant supported by probable cause before conducting a search,
this constitutional prerequisite does not protect the genetic
privacy of individuals whose DNA is stored in recreational DNA
databases or whose relatives have submitted their DNA to these
98

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
100
Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
101
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 473, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
99
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services. A search under the Fourth Amendment occurs when law
enforcement “violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.”102 In order to conduct a search
during a criminal investigation, law enforcement normally must
obtain a search warrant based on probable cause.103 The probable
cause requirement demands that police have sufficient
information to believe that they will likely find evidence of
criminal activity by conducting a search.104 Probable cause
embraces the concepts of “individualized suspicion” and
“antecedent justification.” The Court in Carpenter noted that
under the Fourth Amendment, at least some individualized
suspicion is required before police may conduct a search.105
Furthermore, in Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court
stressed that antecedent justification, or “an objective
predetermination of probable cause,” is “central to the Fourth
Amendment,” and that probable cause cannot be justified after a
search is complete.106
Although the Supreme Court has further held that, subject to
limited exceptions,107 “searches conducted outside the judicial
process . . . are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,”108 law enforcement currently may legally conduct
warrantless familial searching in recreational DNA databases.109
In Katz, the FBI, without a warrant, placed an electronic recording
device outside of a public telephone booth where it suspected
Katz placed illegal telephone calls during which he would
102

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
104
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining probable
cause as “exist[ing] where ‘the facts and circumstances within [police officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has
been or is being committed” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
162 (1925))).
105
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
106
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358, 359 (1967).
107
There are seven discrete exceptions to the search warrant requirement. See
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222 (exigent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 384 (2014) (search
incident to lawful arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)
(automobile); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plain view); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (reasonable search for weapons, or Terry stops); United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (border searches).
108
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (“[T]he Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate
impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the
police.’ ” (quoting Wong Sung v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963))).
109
See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Haag, supra note 97.
103
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“transmit[] wagering information” in violation of federal law.110
The Government argued that these recordings were not obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment because it had established
probable cause and because the surveillance was limited in scope
and duration.111 The Court rejected this argument, however,
finding that this was an illegal search under the Fourth
Amendment.112 The Court reasoned that it was not enough “that
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime
and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive
means consistent with that end,”113 because this approach left to
police discretion whether and how individuals would be protected
by the Fourth Amendment.114 This reasoning, however, has not
yet been applied to DNA data stored in recreational databases,
which is currently protected by rules formulated by and in the
disretion of the businesses themselves.115 The genetic information
stored in these databases is “governed by the same privacy laws
applicable to any consumer product company . . . . It doesn’t have
any additional levels of safety or security,”116 and law enforcement
need not necessarily obtain a search warrant prior to conducting a
search in these databases.117

110

Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 354 (noting that the previous investigation conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation indicated “a strong probability that [Katz] was using the
telephone” for the criminal activity in question and that agents limited their
surveillance “to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of [Katz]’s
unlawful . . . communications,” and thus only surveilled Katz in “brief periods during
which he used the telephone booth, and took great care to overhear only the
conversations of [Katz] himself”).
112
Id. at 358–59.
113
Id. at 356–57 (emphasis added).
114
Id. at 356, 358–59 (“[T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed
by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”).
115
See, e.g., Bala, supra note 25 (“Without guidance from the government on the
matter, [the founder of GEDmatch] navigated difficult decisions—such as which types
of crimes law enforcement could use the site to try to solve and whether users should
have to opt in to or opt out of sharing their data with the police. . . . [O]ne individual
had the power both to draw th[e] line[s] and to change [them] unilaterally. With no
legal regulations providing clarity on how and when genetic genealogy should be used
to fight crime, we have left private entities in charge of the decision-making.”).
116
Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (internal
quotation omitted).
117
See Ford, supra note 13; cf. Haag, supra note 97.
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While some recreational genealogy companies have
voluntarily chosen to include such protections in their privacy
policies, such protection is woefully insufficient.118 Services like
AncestryDNA and 23andMe have stated that they will only share
information with law enforcement if it is legally compelled.119
However, their privacy policies appear to leave discretion to the
companies themselves regarding when to share this information.
For example, AncestryDNA’s Privacy Statement states that
Ancestry DNA “may share [a customer’s] Personal Information if
we believe it is reasonably necessary to . . . [c]omply with valid
legal process (e.g., subpoenas, warrants).”120 23andMe’s Privacy
Statement states that “23andMe will preserve and disclose any
and all information to law enforcement agencies or others if
required to do so by law or in the good faith belief that such
preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to . . . comply
with legal or regulatory process . . . .”121 Conversely, GEDmatch
requires no warrant at all122 and is very upfront in its Terms of
Service and Privacy Policy, explicitly informing its users that if
they “require absolute privacy and security” they should not
provide their information to GEDmatch at all, or should “delete it
immediately” if they have already provided it.123
118
Brown, supra note 19 (“The only rules [about familial searching in the
consumer space] are in each company’s terms of service. Even then, there may be little
a company can realistically do to keep law enforcement agencies—or anyone else—
from using its service however they like.”).
119
See Jouvenal, Berman, Harwell & Jackman, supra note 22. Regardless of how
protective recreational genealogy services choose to make their privacy policies, a
recent ruling in Florida paves the road for law enforcement’s unfettered use of DNA
stored in recreational databases. In July 2019, Judge Patricia Strowbridge of the
Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida approved a detective’s request for a search
warrant to allow him to “override the privacy settings of GEDmatch’s users and search
the site’s full database.” Kashmir Hill & Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile is
Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-warrant.html.
Within twenty-four hours, GEDmatch complied with the warrant. Id. Thus, there now
exists precedent for future investigators to obtain similar warrants to search within
even larger databases, like AncestryDNA and 23andMe. Id. (highlighting concern
among DNA policy experts that such precedent may transform “all genetic databases
into law enforcement databases”).
120
Privacy Statement, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacy
statement (last updated Dec. 23, 2019) (emphasis added).
121
Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last
updated Jan. 1, 2020) (emphasis added).
122
See Ford, supra note 13 (explaining that GEDmatch, an “open-source system[,]
allowed investigators to avoid the need for a warrant”).
123
GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019). On May 18, 2019,
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Additionally, “[m]any commercial genetic testing company
contracts with participants ‘have clauses that allow them to
change their policy as they choose,’ ”124 which underscores the fact
that this highly sensitive information is not protected in a
dependable way. Even companies that tout their commitment to
consumer privacy may choose at any time to allow investigators to

GEDmatch updated its terms and service to clarify that it accepts law enforcement’s
use of its service for familial search purposes. Id. (“When you upload Raw Data to
GEDmatch, you agree that the Raw Data is one of the following: . . . DNA obtained
and authorized by law enforcement to identify a perpetrator of a violent crime against
another individual . . . .; [or] DNA obtained and authorized by law enforcement to
identify remains of a deceased individual.”). At that time, GEDmatch also added a
“Public + opt-out” feature, allowing individuals’ DNA to be “available for comparison
to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database, except DNA kits identified as being
uploaded for Law Enforcement purposes.” Id. One week later, GEDmatch updated its
privacy policy again, this time implementing an opt-in option for users to select in
order to allow law enforcement to utilize their DNA. Natalie Ram, The Genealogy Site
that Helped Catch the Golden State Killer is Grappling with Privacy, SLATE (May 29,
2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/05/gedmatch-dna-privacy-updatelaw-enforcement-genetic-geneology-searches.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
Alarmingly, Verogen, Inc., a “forensic genomics company whose focus is on human
ID,” announced on December 9, 2019 that it had purchased GEDmatch. Email from
Curtis Rogers, Founder, GEDmatch, to Jamie Zeevi/GEDmatch users (Dec. 19, 2019,
10:09 PM EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter GEDmatch Email]. Verogen, Inc.
openly views GEDmatch as not only a recreational DNA database, but as a valuable
resource for law enforcement. Id. (“Verogen recognizes that law enforcement use of
genetic genealogy is here to stay . . . .”); see also Bala, supra note 25 (noting that
Verogen is currently cooperating with the FBI to “create DNA profiles for the National
DNA Index System,” that Verogen’s Chief Operating Officer has stated that he views
GEDmatch as “molecular eyewitness” that can be used by law enforcement as a tool
to solve crimes, and that “selling its services to crime labs” is “explicitly” part of
Verogen’s business model). Thus, it appears that GEDmatch is more committed than
ever to cooperating with and assisting law enforcement.
124
Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14; see Privacy
Statement, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/privacystatement (last
updated Dec. 23, 2019) (“We may modify this Privacy Statement at any time . . . .”);
Privacy Statement, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last updated
Jan. 1, 2020) (“Whenever this Privacy Statement is changed in a material
way, a notice will be posted . . . -[and] [a]fter 30 days the changes will become
effective.”); GEDmatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019) (“We may update the
GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at any time.”). For a detailed
history of past changes made to GEDmatch’s privacy policy, see Bala, supra note 25.
When Verogen, Inc. purchased GEDmatch, it committed to “fight all unauthorized law
enforcement use and any warrants that may be issued,” GEDmatch Email, supra note
123, and announced that “GEDmatch’s terms of service will not change, with
respect to the use, purposes of processing, and disclosures of user data.” Julian
Husbands, GEDmatch Partners with Genomics Firm, Verogen (Dec. 9, 2019),
https://www.verogen.com/gedmatch-partners-with-genomics-firm/ (last visited Jan.
20, 2020). However, there is nothing to prevent Verogen from changing GEDmatch’s
policies in the future. Bala, supra note 25.
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access their databases and even utilize their laboratories. In 2018,
for example, FamilyTreeDNA, a company that had actively
“marketed itself as a leader of consumer privacy and a fierce
protector of user data” voluntarily allowed the FBI to access its
DNA databases and to utilize its laboratory for investigations of
unsolved violent crimes without ever notifying its users.125 It
became “the first known commercial site to provide some services
without a subpoena or warrant,”126 as opposed to GEDmatch,
which is a free, open-source website.127 There is currently no legal
reason other such commercial sites would not do the same.
Because there is little uniformity amongst recreational genealogy
companies’ privacy policies, and because these companies retain
the power to change these policies at any time, discretion is in the
hands of these companies whether and how to protect the
genetic privacy of their users and, by extension, that of their users’
genetic relatives. Like in Katz, where the Court rejected the
self-restraint argument presented by the Government and deemed
a warrantless search unconstitutional,128 searches within
recreational DNA databases must require more stringent
legal protection.
Furthermore, when conducting a familial search in a
recreational DNA database, law enforcement does so without the
need to establish probable cause. In fact, law enforcement engages
in this investigative technique precisely because it cannot
establish probable cause with respect to an individual. When
investigators conduct such a search, they are inputting DNA from
a crime scene in hopes, but with no guarantee, that a partial match
will be made. In this context, while this genetic information is
being used in a criminal investigation, it will not provide evidence
of criminal activity; at most, it will provide law enforcement with
leads.129 Probable cause requires more than this. Before law
enforcement conducts a familial search, it has no indication
whether the search will result in a partial match at all. Thus, it
would be nearly impossible to argue that law enforcement would
be able to demonstrate probable cause to conduct such a search.

125

Haag, supra note 97. This did not become public until 2019. Id.
Id.
127
See Zhang, How a Tiny Website, supra note 23; Ford, supra note 13.
128
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967).
129
See Eli Rosenberg, Family DNA Searches Seen as Crime-Solving Tool, and
Intrusion on Rights, NY TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/
nyregion/familial-dna-searching-karina-vetrano.html.
126
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Finally, familial searching in recreational databases casts a
wide net that drags in myriad, presumptively innocent,
individuals who were never subject to any individualized suspicion
whatsoever. Essentially, law enforcement is sifting through the
DNA and genealogy of countless random individuals who are
distantly related to a perpetrator whose identity they do not know.
This cannot meet the individualized suspicion requirement.
Nevertheless, the intimate information of these individuals is
utilized in criminal investigations without any legal or judicial
oversight. This is more akin to a fishing expedition than a search
with a reasonably limited scope and reasonably likely results.
Familial searching in recreational DNA databases, it seems, is
the “too permeating police surveillance”130 that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect against.
2.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Due to the unique nature of DNA, current reasonable
expectation of privacy jurisprudence provides an insufficient
standard to protect the DNA stored in recreational databases.
“[T]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are activated only
when the state conducts a search or seizure in an area in which
there is a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.’ ”131 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized
two requirements that must be fulfilled in order for a reasonable
expectation of privacy to be established: where an individual seeks
to preserve things as private and where the subject is something
society is reasonably prepared to recognize as private.132 “When
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy,” however, “the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated.”133
In determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Supreme Court has often highlighted the
importance of one’s ability to exclude others in order to preserve
one’s privacy. In Katz, the Court explained that a person may have
130
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (quoting United States v. Di
Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
131
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting New York v.
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112 (1986)).
132
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“When an individual ‘seeks to preserve
something as private,’ and his expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared
to recognize as reasonable,’ we have held that official intrusion into that private
sphere generally qualifies as a search and requires a warrant supported by probable
cause.” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979))).
133
Davis, 690 F.3d at 241.
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a reasonable expectation of privacy in that which she “seeks to
preserve as private” not only in her own home, but “even in an area
accessible to the public.”134 In addition, the Court in Rakas v.
Illinois explained that having a reasonable expectation of privacy
is not always a function of having a proprietary interest, but may
also exist where an individual has a “sufficient interest” in, and
the ability to exclude others from, that which she seeks to preserve
as private.135 In Rakas, the Court reiterated the reasoning in
Katz that the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded
place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of
the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.”136 The Court in Rakas determined that the
defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
particular places in which a car was searched, not only because
they owned neither the car nor the items seized, but also because
the glove compartment and areas under the seats are not places in
which passengers would “normally have a legitimate expectation
of privacy.”137 In its reasoning, the Court contrasted the facts of
Rakas with those of Jones, where “Jones had complete dominion
and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it,”
and those of Katz, where Katz was able to close the door to
the telephone booth “to exclude all others.”138 The Court’s
juxtaposition and comparison of the facts of these three cases
reiterates the importance of a person’s ability to exclude others to
whether that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

134

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (holding that Katz had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth because he “occupie[d] it, shut[]
the door behind him, and pa[id] the toll that permit[ted] him to place a call”).
135
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978). The Rakas Court illustrated this
using the facts of Jones v. United States as an example, where Jones was held to have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a friend’s apartment where he was staying,
when “[t]he friend had given him permission to use the apartment and a key to it.” Id.
at 141 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960)).
136
Id. at 143. In Rakas, police seized a sawed-off rifle and shells, which the
defendants did not own, from the glove compartment and under the seats of a car,
which the defendants were passengers in but did not own. Id. at 129.
137
Id. at 148–49.
138
Id. at 149.

790

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:767

Although society has long recognized that people have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bodies,139 Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy precedent does not
map onto DNA in recreational DNA databases. In 2012, the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Davis took a step forward in
establishing that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information that her own DNA may provide, due to the
ability of DNA to reveal deeply private information about that
person.140 However, this precedent does not go far enough in
protecting DNA in recreational databases. Even if a person
affirmatively chooses not to submit her DNA to a recreational
database in order to exclude others and to maintain her genetic
privacy, she has no control over whether a distant relative will
reveal portions of this information on her behalf.141 Furthermore,
the law is murky when it comes to whether a genetic relative may
claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the DNA of another
genetic relative. While a substantial amount of case law has
defined the contours of the reasonable expectation of privacy in
different scenarios, the same cannot be said for DNA, which may
involve relatives regardless of whether they have chosen to
preserve their own DNA as private.
An additional wrinkle in Fourth Amendment reasonable
expectation of privacy jurisprudence is that an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is diminished when she is
arrested.142 Maryland v. King, decided by the Supreme Court in
2013, addressed the issue of whether it is a Fourth Amendment
violation for law enforcement, without a warrant, to collect and
analyze DNA from persons arrested on felony charges but not yet
convicted.143 The Court held that in this context, obtaining an

139

United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause the
analysis of biological samples . . . can reveal ‘physiological data’ and a ‘host of private
medical facts,’ such analyses may ‘intrude[] upon expectations of privacy that society
has long recognized as reasonable.’ ” (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989)).
140
Id. at 243–44.
141
See Murphy, supra note 36, at e8 (“[T]he fact that a fifth cousin once removed
uploaded their DNA to an online site means that the government still has one’s
profile, anyway.”).
142
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 462–63 (2013) (“The expectations of privacy
of an individual taken into police custody ‘necessarily [are] of a diminished
scope.’ . . . [U]nlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a
detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
557 (1979)).
143
Id. at 442.
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arrestee’s DNA as a “part of a routine booking procedure” is
reasonable and does not require a warrant.144 Comparing this
practice to photographing or fingerprinting arrestees,145 the Court
reasoned that arrestees “in valid police custody for . . . serious
offense[s] supported by probable cause” have a decreased
expectation of privacy that is outweighed by the government’s
legitimate interest in safely and accurately identifying people in
its custody.146
Unlike DNA samples collected from arrestees, the DNA
contained in recreational databases is voluntarily provided by free
individuals who submitted their DNA samples to these websites.
We must presume that at least some individuals who affirmatively
choose not to submit their DNA, but are genetically related to
individuals who do, are free individuals. In this context, it is the
general public that is affected, not a subgroup of individuals who
may have a diminished expectation of privacy due to contact with
the criminal justice system. Thus, the reasonable expectation of
privacy that free individuals have in their DNA is undermined by
its use in criminal investigations without legal protection.
Furthermore, the court in Davis was careful to clarify that
even a victim of a crime, whose DNA “has come into the lawful
possession of the police,” maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy in her DNA.147 The court expressed concern that such
citizens would “lose any expectation of privacy in [their DNA],
which could be used against [them] at a later date without the
constitutional safeguard that a warrant supported by probable
cause first be issued.”148 Just as the Davis court was concerned
with protecting this type of information when it came to free
individuals in the criminal context, this concern for protection
must be expanded to DNA in the recreational context as well.
Additionally, there is a general sense in society that DNA
should be recognized as something private, and thus protected by
the Fourth Amendment.149 While traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence deals mainly with physical spaces and property and
not the more abstract and intangible type of information that DNA
is and how it can be accessed, in the context of DNA in recreational
144
145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 465–66.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 448, 449.
United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 244 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
See Jouvenal et al., supra note 22.
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databases the Supreme Court’s judicious words in 1925 remain
relevant today: “The Fourth Amendment is to be construed . . . in
a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens.”150 Because the DNA in
recreational DNA databases, as compared to the DNA in CODIS,
has the ability to provide an enormous amount of personal and
intimate information about individuals,151
DNA in these
databases must be protected from uninhibited use by law
enforcement in criminal investigations. DNA is different in that
while there is a feeling in society that this type of information is
deserving of privacy protections, there is simultaneously a
fundamental inability to exclude others from revealing this
information. Because current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding the reasonable expectation of privacy does not protect
DNA stored in recreational DNA databases, and because it does
not protect individuals genetically related to individuals in such
databases, statutory protections are necessary to allow individuals
to exclude others in a way that people are not currently capable of
doing themselves.
3.

Third-Party Doctrine

The third-party doctrine provides that when a person
voluntarily gives her information to a third-party, she no longer
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information, “even
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose.”152 The government may thus
access this information without concern for Fourth Amendment
protections.153 In Carpenter, the Supreme Court considered the
limits of the third-party doctrine in light of modern technology,
and determined that due to the extensive and revealing nature
of CSLI information and the fact that it is automatically
collected, the third-party doctrine did not override the need
for Fourth Amendment protection.154
The Court explained
that, because cell phones are “indispensable to participation
in modern society,” and because CSLI records are created
automatically when a cell phone is operated, CSLI is “not truly
150

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
See Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.
152
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (quoting United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 2223.
151
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‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”155 Thus, the
Court reasoned, “in no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily
‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his
physical movements.”156
Similarly, due to the extensive and revealing nature of the
DNA data provided to recreational databases, Fourth Amendment
protections should override the third-party doctrine. First,
although individuals voluntarily submit their DNA to these
services, the information is provided for limited purposes.
Although alone, this is not enough to override the third-party
doctrine, the extent of what DNA may reveal about an individual,
together with the likelihood that individuals who submit their
DNA samples do not fully understand what they are providing,
demonstrates the need for additional protection. The Court
conceded in Carpenter that its interpretation and application of
the third-party doctrine “must take account of more sophisticated
[technology] that [is] already in use or in development.”157 The
rapidly evolving study of what DNA can reveal must be taken into
account when considering the level of protection it receives.
Second, DNA is different from CSLI due to its unique ability
to implicate genetic relatives, which creates what has been called
a “fourth-party problem.”158 Fourth parties are those who have not
submitted their own DNA samples, but are genetically related to
people who have, and can thus be pulled into criminal
investigations anyway. Put simply, “[i]f you’re upset that your
brother has uploaded his DNA to a commercial DNA
database . . . you don’t really have any legal rights to complain if
the police decide, for example, to collect that DNA or to analyze it
or take a look at it.”159 These individuals do not fall into the
category of individuals subject to the third-party doctrine, nor do
Fourth Amendment protections adequately protect their
reasonable expectations of privacy in their own DNA. Because
DNA is different, these people fall through the cracks between
legal protections. A person “shouldn’t have fewer civil rights
because [she is] related to someone who broke the law.”160

155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 2220.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)).
Id. at 2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
Ford, supra note 13.
Id.
Rosenberg, supra note 129.
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Consent

While a warrantless search may be constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment if the person being searched consents to it,161
consent is not a valid argument in the context of DNA in
recreational databases. First, the consent given by users of these
genealogy services is not truly informed consent. Second, even if
an individual does give fully informed consent, she is effectively
giving this consent on behalf of all her genetic relatives. Similarly,
the option to opt out of allowing one’s DNA to be used in forensic
investigations is insufficient due to the ability of another genetic
relative to opt in.
Consent given by individuals who submit their DNA
to recreational databases is not truly informed consent.162 The
consent that individuals provide is often hidden deep in the fine
print of the terms and conditions of these services.163 Even if a
person takes the time to read the entirety of the terms and
conditions, that person may not understand the extent of what she
has consented to and what the agreement will allow the company
to do with her DNA.164 Those who submit their information to
recreational DNA databases to learn more about their own
genealogy or health predispositions likely have not fully
contemplated, nor do they fully understand, the extent of what
their DNA may reveal or how it can be used now or in the future.165
Individuals likely do not have a true understanding of “the
downstream applications of their pooled genetic profiles,” and the
implications of “third-party access” to this information.166
Additionally, the privacy statements and the terms and conditions
161

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
See Kimberlee Sue Moran, Damned By DNA – Balancing Personal Privacy
With Public Safety, 292 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L e3, e4 (2018).
163
Id.
164
Maggie Fox, What You’re Giving Away with Those Home DNA Tests, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/whatyou-re-giving-away-those-home-dna-tests-n824776.
165
Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14.
166
Moran, supra note 162, at e4. For example, 23andMe shares this information
with “academic and industry partners” for medical research purposes and “cannot
guarantee what will happen to the information once it leaves their hands.” Scutti,
What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14; see also Rubén Rosario,
Opinion, Rosario: Familial DNA Searches Are Becoming a Useful Cop Tool in Cold
Cases, PIONEER PRESS (Mar. 1, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2019/03/
01/rosario-familial-dna-searches-are-becoming-a-useful-cop-tool-in-cold-cases/ (“I was
wary of giving out my DNA. I did it anyway. But most of us really don’t know how
accessible our genetic profiles, and, indirectly, those of family members, might be to
third parties, including the government, by willingly using these sites.”).
162
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of use of recreational DNA services is often very broad and subject
to change at any time.167 Thus, “[w]ithout greater transparency
about the number and nature of recreational genetic searches, it
is impossible for the public to reach an informed decision about
their permissible scope.”168
In the context of DNA, individuals have the unique ability
to essentially, and likely unknowingly, disclose the genetic
relationships between themselves and their genetic relatives
on behalf of their genetic relatives. Simply requiring a party’s
consent to access her DNA data does not address the issue because
the privacy rights of relatives are automatically compromised
by access to the data. When an individual gives consent to
recreational DNA databases to use her DNA, “[s]uch consent is not
limited to the individual user’s DNA. It extends to everyone who
shares that genetic information—past, present, and future.”169
Critically, when people consent to sharing their DNA with such a
service, it is unlikely that they are considering “the genetic privacy
of their distant relatives.”170 Moreover, it is highly unlikely that
before consenting to the use of their DNA by commercial genealogy
services, consumers considered the possibility that “intimate
pieces of their DNA” could be utilized by law enforcement in
criminal investigations.171 Individuals are generally accustomed
to having a choice in whether and when to share their private
information with others. After all, the information is private.
DNA, however, is different.
Some may argue that providing users of recreational DNA
databases with an opt-out option resolves the issue of informed
consent. The argument would be that providing an opt-out option
restores users’ ability to give informed consent by choosing not to
delete their genetic information and profiles from databases once
they learn that their data may be used in ways not originally
contemplated, like in criminal investigations.172 This argument,
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See supra Section II.A.1.
Murphy, supra note 36, at e7.
169
Moran, supra note 162, at e4.
170
Ritter, supra note 19.
171
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1. “[N]o consent has been given by the
contributors to a genealogical collection for their DNA to be used in a way that might
implicate their relatives in a committed crime.” Denise Syndercombe Court, Forensic
Genealogy: Some Serious Concerns, 36 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 203, 203 (2018).
172
Soon after the arrest of the Golden State Killer, GEDMatch highlighted an
opt-out option for its users, posting the following announcement on the GEDMatch
website:
168

796

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:767

however, completely ignores DNA’s unique ability to implicate
one’s relatives and thus does not solve the nonconsent issue. The
issue remains that the decision to maintain one’s genetic privacy
is not in the hands of that individual. Even if a person makes the
decision to delete her DNA data that she had once submitted to a
recreational database, she cannot be guaranteed that any of her
relatives who submitted their DNA would make the same
decision.173 Furthermore, a person who never submitted her own
DNA in the first place cannot be guaranteed that her relatives
would choose to opt out. In both situations, individuals who chose
to maintain their genetic privacy are implicated regardless of their
personal decisions, and the power to consent to a potential genetic
privacy waiver remains with someone else.
Stated another way, one person’s DNA submission to a
recreational DNA database may effectively serve as a waiver of
that person’s individual privacy in her own DNA, as well as that
of countless others who may have otherwise chosen to keep this
information private.174 It is becoming ever more likely that any
given person will have at least a distant relative in “a publicly
searchable database.”175 Critically, even if individuals consent to
waiving their privacy interest in their DNA, “they’re also
[consenting for] their extended family, their children, [and] their
children’s children. . . . And they’re not just [consenting] for” the
present year, but for years in the future as well, “when data from
the genome could be used in all sorts of different ways.”176 “The
reckless handover of DNA erodes our ability to collectively protect
our personal privacy and violates the privacy of those genetically
related but who have not given their explicit consent to be included
in a database.”177

While the database was created for genealogical research, it is important
that GEDmatch participants understand the possible uses of their DNA,
including identification of relatives that have committed crimes or were
victims of crimes. If you are concerned about non-genealogical uses of your
DNA, you should not upload your DNA to the database and/or you should
remove DNA that has already been uploaded.
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1.
173
Molteni, supra note 12 (“You can’t claw back the profile of your third cousin
once removed who you don’t even know exists.” (internal quotation omitted)).
174
Kolata & Murphy, supra note 1 (“Suppose you are worried about genetic
privacy. . . . If your sibling or parent or child engaged in this activity online, they are
compromising your family for generations.”).
175
Ritter, supra note 19.
176
Jouvenal et al., supra note 22.
177
Moran, supra note 162, at e4.

2019]

DNA IS DIFFERENT

797

B. No Statutory Protections Exist for DNA Stored in
Recreational DNA Databases
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 went
into effect on May 21, 2008.178 The purpose of this Act was “[t]o
prohibit discrimination on the basis of genetic information with
respect to health insurance and employment.”179 In making the
determination that this Act was necessary to protect individuals
from the potential consequences of scientific progress, Congress
recognized that the advances in genetic science and testing may
“give rise to the potential misuse of genetic information to
discriminate in health insurance and employment.”180 While some
argue that this Act may not have gone far enough to protect
individuals from genetic discrimination, it provides no protection
whatsoever for DNA in recreational databases.181 Just as there
are protections regarding the provision of this type of information
to doctors and health insurance companies, protections regarding
law enforcement’s access to and use of this type of information
must be protected as well.
While some statutes do exist to protect the DNA information
stored in CODIS and to regulate how such information may be
used, these regulations vary widely. For example, “[w]hile familial
searching is not performed at the national level,”182 states differ as
to whether they use familial searching at all and as to what limits
are placed on the practice. Currently, only a number of states
allow familial searching: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.183
While Illinois and
178
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122
Stat. 881 (2008).
179
Id.
180
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 2,
122 Stat. 881 (2008).
181
Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14 (“[T]he act does
not apply to companies with fewer than 15 employees, and ‘other forms of insurance
including life, disability and long-term care are not covered by [the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act].’ ” (quoting Jeremy Gruber)).
182
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Oct. 18,
2019).
183
James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12
States Use It., NBC NEWS (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/familial-dna-puts-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711;
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Oct. 18,
2019).

798

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:767

Louisiana are currently considering whether to allow familial
searching in CODIS, Maryland and Washington D.C. have chosen
not to allow the use of this technique at all.184 However, while
minimal regulations protect DNA information in CODIS, there are
currently no laws regulating familial searching using recreational
DNA websites.185
As the DNA testing that is currently performed by
recreational DNA services is “more sophisticated than the DNA
tests police currently run, and . . . generate[s] more data than is
stored in the FBI’s CODIS database,” this lack of statutory
protection is, at the very least, alarming.186 “[S]earches in
recreational databases affect a far greater number of innocent
persons, and are conducted with no oversight or governance of any
kind.”187 Strikingly, the STR-tested DNA in CODIS, collected from
individuals with a decreased expectation of privacy, is more
protected than the SNP-tested DNA of innocent individuals in the
recreational context.188
For example, a number of simple regulations exist for
laboratories conducting searches in CODIS, which “represent an
effort to balance the right of individuals to genetic privacy, and to
be free from government intrusion in the absence of suspicion,
against the desire to apprehend law breakers.”189 Such regulations
include requirements that “[a]ll genetic material tested for upload
into the database . . . be done by accredited laboratories and
qualified personnel,” that any DNA sample submitted must be
from “a ‘putative perpetrator’ . . . [and not] profiles derived from
evidence that may [only] have a remote connection to the crime, or
from a mere witness or bystander.”190

184

Rainey, supra note 183.
Murphy, supra note 36, at e6. In January 2019, Maryland legislators
introduced a bill that seeks to extend the state’s ban on familial searching in CODIS
to cover consumer genetic databases as well. Natalie Jones, Maryland Bill Seeks to
Prohibit Using DNA Databases to Solve Crime, NBC WASH. (Feb. 21, 2019, 7:22 AM),
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Bill-Seeks-to-Prohibit-Using-DNADatabases-to-Solve-Crime-506147871.html. As of this writing, the bill remains
adjourned sine die. Maryland House Bill 30, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/MD/bill/
HB30/2019 (last visited Sep. 17, 2019).
186
Zhang, The Coming Wave of Murders Solved, supra note 12.
187
Murphy, supra note 36, at e5.
188
See id. at e7.
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Id. at e6.
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In addition to regulating the use of CODIS, jurisdictions that
allow for familial DNA searches often “supplement these
requirements with [additional] policies.”191 Some limits that have
been enacted include only permitting familial searching to be used
“to solve the most serious cases,” and establishing “[a] separate
oversight committee [to] determine[] when a familial match is
strong enough to disclose it to local investigators.”192 Some policies
also require “that any incidental findings (e.g., non-paternity) are
distanced from local law enforcement,” and that “[w]innowing of
leads” be accomplished “through public or police resources, so as
to minimize the intrusion on persons ultimately ruled out as a
potential lead or suspect.”193
In stark contrast, no such regulations exist surrounding the
use of familial searching in recreational DNA databases.194 This
currently provides law enforcement with the ability to conduct in
recreational databases the searches that they are prohibited from
conducting in CODIS.195 For example, there are no laws or
regulations currently preventing law enforcement from engaging
in “fishing expedition[s]” to find not only perpetrators of crimes,
but individuals tangentially related to the crimes.196 And once
individuals are pinpointed, there are no current laws regulating
the types of follow-up investigations that law enforcement may
conduct.197 “[A] genealogical detective,” for example, “can take
endless amounts of surreptitious samples, . . . [and] sneak
sampl[e] persons in the ‘family tree’ even though they are not
suspects, simply because such samples might help expedite
the investigation by eliminating potential suspect ‘branches.’ ”198
The result of this regulatory imbalance is simple and
nonsensical—“the immediate sibling of a convicted offender

191

Id.
Id. (referencing policies adopted in California).
193
Id. (referencing policies adopted in California).
194
Id.
195
Id. at e7.
196
Id. at e6. This technique may currently be used not only to identify
perpetrators, but “victims, witnesses, [and] bystanders” as well. Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. In the search for the Golden State Killer, police surreptitiously collected
DNA samples from two individual suspects who turned out to be innocent. Id.
“Samples could . . . be taken from victims, victims’ family members or loved ones, or
purported witnesses to a crime—all without those persons knowing that they had been
targeted by police.” Id. at e6–e7.
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has greater protection against genetic surveillance . . . than
a distant biological relation of a person interested in
recreational genomics.”199
III. COMMON COUNTERARGUMENTS AND WHY THEY ARE FLAWED
A.

The Government’s Interest in Identifying Criminals Does Not
Completely Outweigh the Individual’s Interest in Genetic
Privacy

The government has a strong interest in identifying criminals
for the dual purposes of apprehending them and preventing future
crimes, and many argue that this government interest outweighs
the interest of the individual in maintaining her genetic privacy.
In Maryland v. King, police took a DNA sample from King “[a]s
part of a routine booking procedure for serious offenses,” and his
DNA was later found to be a match to DNA obtained from a rape
victim in an unrelated case.200 Holding that “DNA identification
of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of
a routine booking procedure,”201 the Supreme Court recognized the
government’s strong interest in identification as it pertains
to persons in custody and analogized the use of DNA
for identification purposes to law enforcement’s use of
fingerprinting.202 The Supreme Court reasoned that DNA, like a
fingerprint, can provide “an irrefutable identification of the person
from whom it was taken,” and that neither fingerprints nor DNA
are “themselves evidence of any particular crime.”203 The Court
further explained that because law enforcement already uses
routine techniques like fingerprinting and utilization of mug shots
to identify individuals, “[t]he only difference between DNA
analysis and the accepted use of fingerprint databases is the
unparalleled accuracy DNA provides.”204

199

Id. at e7.
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 440 (2013).
201
Id. at 465.
202
Id. at 449, 451.
203
Id. at 451.
204
Id. at 436, 451 (“A DNA profile is useful to police because it gives them a form
of identification to search the records already in their valid possession. In this respect
the use of DNA for identification is no different than matching an arrestee’s face to a
wanted poster of a previously unidentified suspect . . . or matching the arrestee’s
fingerprints to those recovered from a crime scene.”).
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Outstandingly, the Court overlooked the essential feature of
DNA—the vast wealth of information it contains—and failed to
take into consideration this fundamental difference between DNA
and other identification techniques, like fingerprinting. It would
be difficult to overstate how much more revealing DNA data is
than a fingerprint. Neither a fingerprint nor a mug shot has the
capability of doing much more than assisting law enforcement in
confirming the identify of a single individual. In contrast, even in
the criminal context, the STR DNA used in CODIS has the ability
to reveal more, with the potential to point to a person’s immediate
relatives.205 This is not to mention the myriad details that the SNP
DNA stored in recreational DNA databases can reveal about an
individual and her extended relatives.206 Furthermore, modern
genetic science likely has not scratched the tip of the iceberg in
determining what SNP DNA, or even what we currently dub “junk
DNA,” may be able to reveal.207
Regardless, the Court’s logic has not been extended to law
enforcement’s use of recreational DNA databases to conduct
such searches, especially when the search is conducted
without individualized suspicion. When there is such a lack of
individualized suspicion, the Supreme Court has noted that “the
reasonableness of a search ‘is determined by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
[reasonable expectation of] privacy and, on the other, the degree
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
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See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.A.
207
See, e.g., What are the Next Steps in Gemonic Research?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/nextsteps (last visited
Jan. 13, 2020) (“Discovering the sequence of the human genome was only the first step
in understanding how the instructions coded in DNA lead to a functioning human
being. The next stage of genomic research will begin to derive meaningful knowledge
from the DNA sequence. Research studies that build on the work of the Human
Genome Project are under way worldwide.”); see also, e.g., What is the Encyclopedia of
DNA Elements (ENCODE) Project?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/encode (last visted Jan. 13, 2020)
(“The approximately 20,000 genes that provide instructions for making proteins
account for only about 1 percent of the human genome. Researchers embarked on the
ENCODE Project to figure out the purpose of the remaining 99 percent of the genome.
Scientists discovered that more than 80 percent of this non-gene component of the
genome, which was once considered ‘junk DNA,’ actually has a role in regulating the
activity of particular genes (gene expression).”).
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interests.’ ”208 Importantly, our system of justice “do[es] not accept
even [a] small level of intrusion, [such as fingerprinting] for free
persons without Fourth Amendment constraint.”209
Here, the government’s interest in identification of criminals
must be weighed against the interests of free individuals in
maintaining control over their genetic privacy. While the
government and society have a strong interest in identifying
criminals—particularly violent criminals like serial killers and
rapists—keeping them off the streets, and preventing crimes, this
should not be permitted at the complete expense of individuals’
genetic privacy without regulations or Fourth Amendment
protection. While the Fourth Amendment requires that searches
be reasonable, “what is reasonable depends on the context within
which a search takes place.”210 Here, DNA’s extremely revealing
nature and its ability to implicate countless individuals tips the
balance toward the interest of the individual in a way that
fingerprinting simply does not.
B. The Anonymization of Genetic Information in Recreational
Databases is Ineffective and Thus Insufficient to Protect
Genetic Privacy
Some may argue that because recreational DNA companies
anonymize the genetic information stored in their databases,
individuals’ genetic privacy is sufficiently protected. However,
this solution is superficial and unrealistic. First, it is important to
note that DNA submitted to recreational DNA websites often does
not remain solely with those websites. In fact, many commercial
genealogy companies ultimately plan to sell customers’ genetic
information to pharmaceutical companies or medical researchers,
if they do not do so already.211 Additionally, commercial sites have
little control as to where this information may eventually end
208

United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)).
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Id. at 245 (quoting Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–62 (2013) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
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See Scutti, What the Golden State Killer Case Means, supra note 14. For
example, GlaxoSmithKline recently reached a deal with 23andMe to acquire a $300
million stake in the genealogy company. Brodwin, supra note 93. GlaxoSmithKline
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purchase of GEDmatch). “We ask these sites to be responsible stewards of our
information, but they are nevertheless subject to incentives to make millions by
selling our data to others.” Bala, supra note 25.
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up.212 Frighteningly, the inability to determine who possesses
one’s genetic information may mean that it could be
extraordinarily difficult to prove that an employer or insurer is
engaging in genetic discrimination and subject to the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, if one even suspects such
a possibility.213
Second, while commercial genealogy companies contend that
any genetic information shared with the company is anonymized,
true anonymization can neither be achieved nor guaranteed.214
Benjamin Berkman, a National Institutes of Health bioethicist,
stated that while companies can tout all the “procedural and
technical safeguards . . . put in place to protect the confidentiality
of [people’s] data,” anonymity can, nevertheless, not be
promised.215 This is because a person’s anonymized DNA can be
re-identified in a fairly simplistic way. In a recent study, for
example, Yaniv Erlich’s team found that “[o]nce relatives are
found, an anonymous person can be re-identified by constructing
a family tree, searching for additional relatives and then
triangulating from there.”216 In this way, Erlich’s team was able
to “re-identif[y] a woman from her ‘anonymous’—though publicly
available—DNA information.”217
Most concerning in the criminal context, however, is a recent
study that found that DNA may be used to identify individuals and
their relatives by cross-referencing the STR DNA in CODIS with
the SNP DNA in recreational databases and vice versa.218 This
212
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discovery is significant in that it suggests the use of commercial
and criminal DNA databases in ways “not intended in the context
of either database examined in isolation.”219 Noah Rosenberg, one
of the authors of the study, explained the significance
simply, stating that “[d]ifferent databases constructed for different
purposes might independently not provide enough information to
reveal a person’s identity but by combining information from
multiple databases identifications can be made.”220 A recreational
DNA profile linked to a profile in CODIS, for example,
“could . . . reveal physical appearance or medical information for a
criminal or their relatives, such as genes for eye color or a disease,
even though the forensic databases aren’t supposed to contain that
kind of information.”221 Again, this raises a significant privacy
concern not only for free individuals who may or may not have
submitted their DNA to commercial companies but who are
nevertheless included in such searches, but also for individuals
who have come into contact with the criminal justice system and
have DNA profiles in CODIS. This is yet another scenario where
anonymization of genetic information in DNA databases falls
short in protecting individuals’ genetic privacy.
C. Despite the Time Consuming and Work-Intensive Nature of
Familial Searching, Stringent Regulation Is Necessary
While it is unclear how often law enforcement conducts
familial searches in recreational and commercial DNA
databases,222 some try to mitigate the concerns surrounding the
technique by arguing that it will not be used frequently, as it
requires a substantial amount of time and personpower.223 The
argument is that familial searching in recreational DNA
databases has the potential to “generate an extraordinary number
of leads, and running them all down using both nongenetic and
genetic information requires a lot of police power.”224 The accuracy
of this statement is demonstrated by the effort to identify Joseph
James DeAngelo Jr. as the Golden State Killer, which entailed “a
219
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team of five investigators [who] spent four months building out
family trees, name by name. [The team] pored over census
records, newspaper obituaries, gravesite locaters, and police and
commercial databases to find each relative and, ultimately,
DeAngelo.”225
Furthermore, others note that the concerns
surrounding increased forensic use of recreational DNA databases
are overstated.226
An investigative genetic genealogist, for
example, criticized recent studies that demonstrate the vast
identification capabilities of DNA in recreational databases, and
argued that the researchers “ma[d]e a lot of assumptions that
aren’t in line with reality, . . . [by] assuming some head-starts” not
necessarily available to investigative genealogists.227
However, neither infrequent use of familial searching in
recreational DNA databases nor inconsistent access of
investigators to “critical demographic information”228 present
sufficient rationales for not protecting genetic information. The
necessity of Fourth Amendment protection is not premised upon
how much effort it would take law enforcement to access one’s
information, and the public need not place trust in law
enforcement’s voluntary decisions regarding whether or not to
utilize familial searching in recreational DNA databases.229
Furthermore, as genetic research and computer technology
advance, it is not unforeseeable that less personpower would be
required to utilize this technique in the future.230 While it took
investigators four months to identify the Golden State Killer, for
example, it took the Sacramento District Attorney’s office only ten
days to identify the NorCal Rapist using the same techniques.231
Because it is impossible to predict the extent of the information
225
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DNA may reveal, how this information may be used in the future
and by whom, and because the personal information of countless
individuals is implicated, statutory protections are necessary to
protect the information in these databases.
IV. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO SAFEGUARD
GENETIC INFORMATION STORED IN RECREATIONAL
DNA DATABASES
While law enforcement’s use of familial searching in
commercial and recreational DNA databases is just beginning,
there are indications that this technique may become more
prevalent in the future.232 As the DNA stored in these databases
will soon have the potential to identify nearly everyone, the
privacy implications of forensic use of these databases are
far-reaching.233 Furthermore, law enforcement’s unregulated
access to the genetic information stored in these databases has the
potential to result in unwarranted invasions of privacy, whether
or not people volunteered their own DNA samples. “A person’s
privacy in the contents of each microscopic bundle of DNA should
be more stringently protected because of the unpredictability
and density of the genetic information it contains.”234 Without
statutory protections, society must place its trust that genetic
privacy will be respected and protected in the hands of companies
that profit by exploiting this information. Most unrealistically,
these companies would have to voluntarily agree on how DNA
information should be protected.235 It is thus imperative that
statutory protections be implemented to safeguard individuals’
genetic privacy.
Some statutory suggestions consider ways in which the
genetic information itself may be protected. For example, Yaniv
Erlich recommends “that all genetic information be encrypted to
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protect the information.”236 However, this suggestion alone is
insufficient to protect genetic information and prevent DNA from
being re-identified. Even if a commercial genealogy company were
to be required to encrypt the data submitted to it, this would not
protect the genetic information already shared with medical
researchers and pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, to
maintain protection, every time the information was shared or
sold, the information would have to be decrypted and the following
party would then have to re-encrypt it. Any statutory protection
that includes encryption would have to require such a process.
Other suggested statutory protections focus on the importance
of informed consent and ensuring that people are aware of the
possibility that their genetic information may be used in criminal
investigations. Denise Syndercombe Court, a professor in the
Forensic Science Research Group at King’s College London,
suggests that companies openly provide “information about both
the benefits and risks to individuals,” instead of hiding this
information in the terms of service.237 Erin Murphy, a professor of
law at New York University, goes a step further, adding that
“compulsory disclosure of law enforcement activity” should be
required.238 While requiring such communication would be a step
in the right direction with regard to individuals who submit their
DNA directly to commercial genealogy companies, this solution
does not address genetically related individuals’ lack of
opportunity to provide informed consent.239
Some have suggested banning familial searches in
recreational DNA databases altogether.240 This suggestion may be
too extreme, however, as it does not take into consideration the
significant societal interest in solving past crimes and preventing
future crimes, nor does it recognize that this tool may be useful if
used properly. A more realistic solution is one that would focus on
limiting how and when familial searching in recreational DNA
databases may be used. A common suggestion is that the use of
this technique be used sparingly, only to solve violent crimes like
rape and murder,241 or only “when all other investigative
236
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approaches have failed.”242 While there are significant differences
in the STR DNA in CODIS and the SNP DNA in recreational
databases, an important first step in regulating the use of
familial searching in recreational databases would be to impose
similar protections on the recreational databases as exist to
regulate CODIS.243
CONCLUSION
While familial searching in recreational DNA databases may
be an effective new tool for law enforcement, there currently exists
a serious lack of protection for the genetic privacy of those who
submitted DNA samples, and those to whom they are genetically
related. Like the CSLI information discussed in Carpenter v.
United States, DNA information is profoundly revealing,
illustrating a person’s fundamental personhood.244 DNA also has
the unique ability to reveal who a person is related to, implicating
countless others, past, present, and future.245 Again, as the
Supreme Court proclaimed in Carpenter, “as ‘[s]ubtler and more
far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to
the Government’ [we must] ensure that the ‘progress of science’
does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.”246 It remains to
be seen whether the Supreme Court will deem DNA a unique type
of data and whether it will find familial searching in recreational
databases subject to Fourth Amendment protections. In the
meantime, the implementation of statutory protections is crucial
to regulate whose DNA data may be accessed or used, by whom,
how, and under what circumstances. As Erin Murphy eloquently
stated, “[b]ig genome data has arrived; it is time to do something
more than gape in wonder at it.”247
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